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IN THE SUPREME 'COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FIRST NATIONAL BANK.
IN GRAND JUNCTION,
a National Banking Association,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RALPH OSBORNE and
JIM L. HUDSON,
Defendants and Appellant.

Case No.
12804

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
The Trial Court granted plaintiff, First National Bank in Grand Junction, a directed verdict upon
the conclusion of the evidence, and defendant, Hudson, appealed. The Court reversed and ordered a new
trial. Bank petitions this Court for a rehearing with
respect to its decision of November 17, 1972, and
urges the Court to permit additional oral argument
with respect to the issues and facts.
The Bank believes that the Court's decision affirms the trial court's determination to the effect
that Hudson's signature on the Loan Guaranty
Agreement is geniune and that such fact, not having
been disputed by Hudson in this appeal, is no longer
in issue. If the foregoing statement is not correct,
clarification is essential to the final disposition of
this case.
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Bank believes the Court may have been inadequately informed of the issues in this case and urges
the Court to reconsider the issues as hereafter set
out.
POINT I
THIS IS A CONTRACT CASE.
THE DEFENSE RAISED IS FRAUD.
On page 2 of the decision the Court states: "We
do not believe this is a case of fraud at all." The
suit obviously involves a contract-a contract of
guaranty; however, the entire thrust of Hudson's
defense in the trial court and his appeal is based
upon the theory of fraud in factum: that Hudson's
signature was fraudulently obtained "by trick, ruse,
slight of hand or other artifice.... " (Pages 32, 36,
41, 47, 56, 59 and 62 of Hudson's brief.) The Superior Court of New Jersey stated in 1961:
The defense of fraud in the f actum presents
in theory a somewhat confused intermingling
of tort and contract principles. At the heart of
the assertion of non est fact um is the absence
of that degree of mutual assent prerequisite
to formation of a binding contract; absent the
proverbial "meeting of the minds" one cannot
be said to have obligated himself in law and
the purported transaction is regarded as void.
This is basic contract doctrine. . . . (Cases
cited.) Thus, where the signer of the instru·
ment has been led to believe and does believe
that he is signing something of a different
character from the note he actually does i~·
scribe, he has not in fact assented to the obh·
gation represented by the paper.
2

The New Jersey Superior Court also held in the same
case that the burden is upon the signer to prove his
defense of fraud in the fact um:
The imposition upon the maker of the burden
of establishing freedom from negligence, as an
essential ingredient of his defense of fraud in
the factum . .. (cases cited) ... comprises
more than empty verbiage. It is an explicit
direction to the signer of an instrument to
come forward either with evidence that the
physical circumstances of the signing and representations made to him were so far removed
from the realm of negotiable paper that he
could not reasonably have fore seen or otherwise observed the subsequent effect of his signature, or to produce proof of legally mitigating circumstances in the form of his own
physical or mental inability to comprehend the
essence of the deception. Factors to be considered in mitigation may include physical disability (e.g. blindness), illiteracy, unfamiliarity with the English language, low general intelligence, unfamiliarity with commercial
transactions, unavailability of interpretive
aid, and misrepresentation by means of physical deceution (e.g. substitution of papers by
slight of hand). Bancredit Inc. v. Bethea, 68
N.J. Super. 62, 172 A.2d 10 at 41 (1961).
The rules of law on this point are generally discussed at 160 A.L.R. 1285 wherein some courts
equate fraud in factum with forgery or other fraudulent acts which go to the heart of the contract-that there is no contract at all; however, there is one
essential difference from a forgery. The signer cannot protect himself against a forger; but here when
3

in fact Hudson signed the document, Hudson could
have averted the loss by not signing the Loan Guaranty Agreement. The courts sometimes refer to
equitable arguments in these cases by saying that ,
equity will not permit the defendant to assert that
the agreement which he signed and upon which the
plaintiff justifiably relied, to its damage, was a nullity. Where one of two innocent parties must suffer,
the law should fall upon the one who by his misplaced confidence has made the fraud possible. Judge
of Probate v. Nudd, 105N.H.311, 199 A.2d 296
(1964) and Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. oi.
sen, 150 F.2d. 385 (8th Cir. 1945.)
>

Fraud in the inducement is another type of
fraud which is often misunderstood, and in this case
the theories have been intermingled. In the inducement theory the signer of the document knows he is
signing the document but is induced to do so by
fraudulent misrepresentations. Hudson in no respect
contends this is an inducement; however the evidence
at the trial suggests inducement in that Osborn solicited Hudson's financial cooperation to buy controlling interest in the Moab bank. In the inducement
theory the general rule of law (no Utah cases) pro- '
vides that the Bank may recover from Hudson unless
Bank has knowledge of Osborne's fraud; however,
even in the inducement theory Hudson has the burden of proving the fraud:

1

'"Misrepresentation or fraud by a principal to
a surety are not chargeable to the obligee ab4

--sent proof that the obligee had notice thereof.
Chrysler Corporation v. Hanover Insurance
Company, 350 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1965), 38
Am.Jur.2d., page 1061, quoted infra.
Johnson v. Allen, 108 U. 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945),
while not involving a third party (the Bank, here)
is a typical inducement case. In Johnson v. Allen this
Court affirmed a directed verdict between parties to
the alleged fraud (i.e. Osborne and Hudson), saying
at P. 138:
"The evidence of fraud must be clear, precise
and indubitable; otherwise it should be withdrawn from the jury."
Can Hudson in this case have a lesser burden here
against the innocent third party Bank than he would
have if Hudson sued Osborne directly?
The Court in its decision acknowledges that the
case is based upon the alleged fraud in factum of
Osborne when, in the last full paragraph of the majority decision, the Court states: "If Hudson was
imposed upon to sign a paper which he never intended to sign; or if he did not know his signature
was being affixed to the Loan Guaranty Agreement
... " Further, the Court in its decision, by ruling
that the proffered testimony regarding Osborne's
motive to procure the Hudson signature by "trick
or fraud" was admissible confirms that this is a
case of fraud infactum.
This being a case of fraud, it matters little
whether in factum or inducement; Hudson has the
5

burden of pleading and proving the fraud, as re.
quired by Rule 9 (b) of Utah Rules of Civil Proced.
ure and the leading Utah case as to the elements of
fraud Oberg v. Sanders, 111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229
(1947), both of which are cited and quoted in Bank's
brief previously filed. The Court determined that
Hudson has a burden of going forward with the
evidence; however, the Court makes the puzzling
comment, " ... the ultimate burden of showing an '
agreement is on the Plaintiff." Does this mean that
Bank has the ultimate burden of proving the absence
of fraud? If this is the ruling of this Court, it is
clearly contrary to the authorities cited in this paragraph and Rule 1 ( 4) of U.R.E. On the other hand, '
if Hudson has the burden of proving the fraud, then
the excluded evidence is not relevant since it does not
prove a fraud but merely proves that Osborne had a
possible motive to commit a fraud. In no event does
it prove the fraud clearly, precisely and indubitably
as required by Johnson v. Allen, supra.
On page 2 of the Court's opinion it cites 38
Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty, Section 55, at page 1058. Immediately below this paragraph and on the same
page it is provided:
"The rules as to mistake, and relief against
mistake, which apply to contracts generally
apply to guaranty contracts. Thus, when the
guarantor seeks to avoid li~bility ~n his prom- ,
ise of guaranty-the promise havmg bPen accepted by the creditor-on the basis that he
(the guarantor) did not understand the legal
6

significance of the document which he signed
the concept of objective mutual assent ofte~
precludes such defense.... The present rule
requires the guarantor to read (at least if he
can read), to inquire as to facts which would
be apparent to reasonable persons, and to understand the legal significance of the document which he is signing. Any mistake which
could have been corrected by due diligence
and which is not the result of imposition practiced on the guarantor by the creditor (or
someone for whom the creditor is responsible)
is not a basis :for rescinding the guaranty
agreement if the creditor reasonably relied on
the promise of the guarantor."
Further, in Section 58, page 1061, it is stated:
"While the guarantor may successfully defend
the creditor's action by showing that his execution of the contract of guaranty was procured by imposition which was practiced by
the creditor, he cannot defeat a recovery by
proof that he executed the instrument as a result of misconduct on the part of the principal
debtor. On the contrary, if the creditor did
not participate therein or have knowledge
therein, recovery by him is not defeated by the
fact that the debtor induced the guarantor to
execute the contract by false representations
or other misconduct."
The Court states: "When the plaintiff proved
the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement to be
that of Hudson, it made out a prima facie case and
the burden of going forward with evidence would
fall upon the defendant Hudson." Hudson totally
failed to go forward with any evidence except his
7

self-serving declaration neither admitting nor denying the signature ( R. 7 and R. 98), coupled with an
offer of proof that Osborne had a motive to commit
a fraud. No evidence was admitted or offered that
Osborne did in fact impose upon Hudson or trick '
Hudson into signing the Loan Guaranty Agreement.
If the Court's opinion in this case requires the Bank
to prove the absence of fraud, the decision would
permit any party to a written contract to at least ,
have a jury pass on the issue whenever he states
that he does not know how his signature got on the
paper-notwithstanding a finding by the trial court
that such person in fact signed the contract.
POINT II
OSBORNE'S ST ATF,MPNT TO A THIRD
PARTY IS NOT ADMISSIBLE.
The Bank urges the Court to reconsider its opinion that the proffered testimony by Osborne to a
third party, referring to Hudson: '"I finally was
able to hang one on him. I've been laying for him
for some time and I finally got the chance to do it."
is admissible in thiCJ case between Bank and Hudson.
The Bank for this argument concedes that such
statement would be admissible against Osborne if
he were sued by Hudson; however, he has not been
so sued, and Osborne is not in this case. The trial
court, in addition to finding that the matter was
hearsay and hence objectionable, also found that the
statement was vague and indefinite. The person of·
f ering the testimony was not able to tie Osborne's
8

1

reference to the possibility that Osborne had defrauded Hudson. Is it not just as logical to speculate
that Osborne was referring to the fact that Hudson
had agreed to be his guarantor and was now being
called upon to make good on his guaranty? Bank
submits that its speculation is just as valid as Hudson's speculation that Osborne was making an admission that he had practiced a fraud (a civil
wrong) against Hudson. If Rule 55 of Rules of Evidence is applicable (see Point IV), it requires that
the material be relevant and that such evidence prove
some material fact. The relevancy is speculative.
Even assuming the Hudson view of the speculation,
the evidence would not prove the fraud but would
only tend to prove Osborne's motive or intent with
respect thereto. For emphasis, the Bank again
states: This is not a case between Hudson and Osborne!
POINT III
HUDSON'S OFFER OF PROOF THAT OSBORNE
USED THE MONEY TO COVER UP DEFALCATIONS NEITHER PROVES NOR DISPROVES
THAT HUDSON SIGNED THE LOAN GUARANTY AGREEMENTS NOR THAT HE WAS IMPOSED UPON BY OSBORNE IN SIGNING THE
SAME.

For the purposes of argument the Bank acknowledges that in a case between Hudson and Osborne the proffered testimony would show that Osborne had a motive to obtain money; however, in
this instance between the Bank and Hudson, such
9

evidence would not cast any light on the issue of
whether Hudson was imposed upon by Osborne to
sign the Loan Guaranty Agreement, not knowing it
was such an agreement. The law throughout the
United States is clear that if a person is imposed
upon by fraud in the inducement, i.e. that he is induced by misrepresentation to sign a document (well
knowing that he was signing the document), such a
person may use such fraud to recover against the
debtor (Osborne) but may not use such defense
against the creditor (the Bank). 71 A.L.R. 1278.
Thus the speculation of Hudson's dilemma: Not being able to offer evidence to the effect that he was
fraudulently induced by Osborne into signing the ,
agreement (since the law of inducement would not
afford him a defense), Hudson has denied that he
signed the agreement, and for his only proof offers
the fact that Osborne had a motive-Le. Osborne
needed money to cover defalcations. The Bank urges
the Court that the inducement speculation is as valid '
as the factum speculation. Neither possibility is
more probable than the other. This being so, the
proffered evidence does not tend to prove the ultimate fact and should not be received into evidence.
POINT IV

MISAPPLICATION OF RULE 55, UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE.

The Court cites Rule 55, Rules of Evidence, to
support its opinion that Osborne's statement to a
third party, inferring the commission of a civil
10

wrong, is admissible to prove Osborne's alleged imposition upon Hudson. Bank urges that this view of
Rule 55 is not correct. Rule 55 provides that evidence
of one committed civil wrong may be introduced to
show motive, intent (or other relevant material
fact) relative to the commission of a second civil
wrong. Here Hudson seeks to use the Osborne statement to a third party to prove the fraud in the first
instance. Rule 55 does not cover that situation. If
Hudson wants to have Osborne's statements in evidence, Hudson could either depose Osborne or join
him. Hudson did neither.
POINT V

HUDSON DID NOT OFFER ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME THE BANK'S PRIMA
FACIE CASE THAT THE SIGNATURE WAS
HIS.

If the Court affirms the preliminary statement
by the Bank in this brief to the effect that the Hudson signature is genuine, this Point V is not relevant; however, if the question of the genuineness is
still before the Court, it urges the Court to consider
the point.
When Bank presented expert testimony to prove
Hudson's signature, the burden of going forward
with the evidence to disprove the signature shifted
to Hudson. No evidence was presented by Hudson
except his self-serving declaration neither admitting
nor denying the signature. If there were genuine
doubt as to the genuineness of the signature, expert
witnesses for Hudson undoubtedly would have tes11

tified and the jury would then have had the opportunity of making a factual determination as to
whether or not the signature was in fact Hudson's.
In the absence of any such evidence on Hudson's behalf, the trial court came to the only conclusion that
could follow from the facts-that Hudson signed
the agreement. The Court's opinion needs clarification on this point. Does the Court dispute the finding
of the trial court that Hudson signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement? On page 2 of its opinion the Court
seems to agree with the trial court, saying: "When
the plaintiff proved the signature ... "; however,
the ruling that "there was a question for the jury"
begs the question: What question is there for the ,
jury to decide?
POINT VI

BANK MET ITS "ULTIMATE" BURDEN OF
SHOWING AN AGREEMENT. CLARIFICATION
OF DECISION NEEDED.

The Court on page 2 of its decision states that '
the Bank, having made out a prima facie case, "the
burden of going forward with evidence would fall
upon the defendant Hudson. However, the ultimate
burden of showing an agreement is on the plaintiff."
The Bank urges that it met its ultimate burden by
showing the signature of Hudson, an agreement in
writing and consideration, the consideration being
the loan to Osborne. 38 Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty, Sec·
tions 43 and 44, pages 1045to1047.
If the Court does not reverse its decision as
12

previously urged and continues its decision requiring a new trial, Bank urges the Court to clarify its
decision with respect to burden of proof. Rule 76(a)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure directs the Court to
determine all questions of law necessary to the final
determination of the case. Bank renews its position
that the burden to prove the fraud in f actum is on
Hudson and that Bank in any event proved its "ultimate" burden. If the Court is of a contrary opinion,
clarification of its decision with reference to burden
of proof as to the alleged fraud practiced on Hudson
is also necessary to aid the trial court in the retrial
of this case.
Bank urges the Court that justice requires additional arguments in this case to more fully present the issues to the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM H. NELSON
500 First National Bank Bldg.
Grand Junction, Colorado
THERALD N. JENSEN
190 North Carbon Avenue
Price, Utah
L. ROBERT ANDERSON
Monticello, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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